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Discussion
Chairman van Roggen
Before we begin the general discussion, I would like to comment briefly
upon one of Dean Macdonald's points. He noted there are some sixteen or
eighteen arrangements, such as the International Joint Commission, between
Canada and the United States, and that naturally, between two federal
jurisdictions, these arrangements are only entered into between the two
federal authorities. However, in doing our study on Canada-United States
relations, we came across an American study that had been done which had
discovered a total of seven hundred and sixty-six agreements, understandings
and arrangements between Canadian provinces and northern states which
had been arrived at without the intervention of either federal government.
Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette
I would like to pursue Senator van Roggen's comment further and ask
Dean Macdonald whether this federal dimension should be brought into the
picture. There are not only questions of agreements. There are conferences,
for example, between the governors of New England states and the eastern
provinces. There is also the conference between the Great Lakes premiers and
governors who met before the agreement of 1972. I was wondering whether
this specific problem of provincial participation would provide something less
formal and grow in the direction of Professor Baxter's advocacy for less formal solutions. There are so many questions that cannot be put to a formal
institution that the solution would be a little different if one were to consider
this practical aspect of provincial participation.
R.St.J. Macdonald, Q.C.
I think the problem may be that the activity of the provinces in what has
been regarded as largely an international domain has, to put it mildly, complicated the relationship between the federal government and the governments of other countries with which the federal authority must deal. One has
only to look, for example, at the statement the provincial premiers issued
after their meeting last August, in which they indicated very strongly that
they were asserting a desire for a role in the Canada-United States relationship. They mentioned trade, agriculture and a number of other activities. I
was simply suggesting that while we have had this problem in the past, it is
infinitely more difficult and more awkward at this moment, when our internal situations seem to be less than fully settled. Therefore, one would have to
give some thought as to what the role of the provincial authorities would be
in a comprehensive dispute settlement agreement. I agree with Professor
Jacomy-Millette that there would have to be a role, if only for constitutional
and practical reasons, because so many areas of concern fall within provincial
jurisdiction so that the authority of those units would have to be involved.
The question is how is this to be done? Under the old system, it
presumably was done here. It was done, as Professor Baxter said, through a
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process of pretty sophisticated intrafederal negotiation between Ottawa and
the provincial leaders. A position was hammered out, agreed upon, and then
a front could be presented. The fabric of this, however, seems to be coming
apart. I think my simple point was that this would have to give one pause for
some concern before thinking about this wider kind of agreement.
Finally, as the Chairman quite correctly reminded us, this agreement
would be one between the federal authorities here and the federal authorities
in Washington. But what is this agreement to do and in what areas? That is
one of my main points. I think that the remedy-or the procedure-has to be
specifically tailored to the problem.
Marcel Cadieux, c.r.
The differences between our legal systems, our constitutional systems,
may have a bearing on the attitude of the two countries concerning judicial
settlement. For instance, in the United States, a treaty that is approved by
two-thirds of the Senate is binding on every part of the country. In our country, unless it is Within federal jurisdiction-and the boundaries of that are not
always clearly specified-we are left with a problem. Consequently, there are
hesitations and inhibitions as to how far we can travel this route. Then, in
the United States, the three branches-of government have positions that do
not correspond to the ones in this country. In the United States, the judicial
branch plays a role that is essentially different from the one judges play in
this country. Traditionally, in the United States, political leaders-for reasons
which I leave to your imagination-have been tempted to ask the courts to
give legal answers to political problems. I think the approach is different in
this"country. In the United States there may be a readier disposition to call in
the law and leave it to the judge than there might be in Canada. This may
be a factor. I think this may lead to attitudes which may differ on both sides
of the border.
Chairman van Roggen
Certainly, on your first point Mr. Ambassador, it has been said by some
that Canada is not a sovereign state. This is a little hard to get into one's
mind, but it -comes very close to that when you think of the inability of the
federal government to bind our provinces in matters of international treaties.
In our study of these seven hundred and sixty-six arrangements, we satisfied
ourselves that ninety-nine percent of them are logically entered into between
the provinces and the states. They involve firefighting apparatus crossing the
boundary between Maine and New Brunswick and things of that sort. If you
ever attempted to achieve such an arrangement through the federal powers, it
would never happen. It is practical to do it at a lower level, so do not be
taken aback by that.
Gabriel Warren
Perhaps it is too early to ask this question of Dean Macdonald, but I will
plant the question in his mind now and follow up closer to Christmas. Dean

1978]

DISCUSSION

Macdonald is the Canadian representative on the United Nations General
Assembly legal committee, and I was wondering whether he has become
frustrated when his somewhat far-reaching ideas on the evolution of peaceful
dispute settlement begin to clash with the somewhat more pragmatic views of
the Canadian government. My somewhat limited personal experience confirms the points made by Ambassador Cadieux. The Canadian and United
States positions appear to be rather pragmatic. I think that both governments
are wary about entering into general obligations whereby perhaps any type of
legal dispute can be drawn into a compulsory system. I would say the position
of the two governments is rather cautious but pragmatic. If one is going to
proceed with the evolution of more and more compulsory jurisdiction, it is
appropriate to choose specific areas-fisheries, hydro-carbons and maritime
boundary areas, for instance-and develop machineries to suit these particular matters and then build upon these until more and more matters are
covered.
I had the rather unique experience of being in Geneva during the working phase of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. One of
the subjects discussed a great deal was a proposal by Professor Binshelder of
Switzerland to have a convention on the compulsory settlement of disputes
that would bind all the countries of Europe and the United States and
Canada. The whole situation was complicated because it would not only have
bound the individual states; it would also have bound the countries of Eastern
Europe. And we all know their position on compulsory jurisdiction. In that
forum, Canada took the view that in order to be realistic, the European
Security Conference should find two or three areas, set up machinery and
build upon that. We were accused by Professor Binshelder of taking an
Anglo-Saxon pragmatic view. That proposal is still on the table, and I
predict that if anything is ever going to happen with it, Professor Binshelder
will have to take a rather pragmatic view. So my question remains to Dean
Macdonald: is he starting to get frustrated yet, or is that something that will
come later?
R.St.J. Macdonald, Q.C.
Still optimistic; not frustrated. But I think I am aware, as I am sure
everybody in this room is, of the innate conservatism in Canadian society and
of our very small "c" conservative reaction to so many of these questions.
I started out by saying that because of this article which John Holmes
wrote, we have to look at the mechanisms that have been established at the
international level. They are very rich, and there are a great many of them.
Then I brought it down to what the situation now is between Canada and the
United States. And there you and I are probably very much ad idem in this
regard. I went on to think about identifying some of the problems that we
now have. Perhaps that is where there is a divergence of opinion. With
regard to some of these problems, I think we ought to be fairly imaginative.
Why do we always hold back?
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I can be as pragmatic as the Canadian government in some ways. I do
not want to find a procedure that is totally inappropriate for the particular
dispute. Nor do I believe that we ought to make a gesture for the promotion
of a peaceful settlement or to promote international law which is totally
against our interests and totally inappropriate. I am not in favor of that at
all. However, governments need to find some kind of reassurance. They need
to be told that there are procedures that are not going to embarass them and
are not going to lead them to feel, after the event, that they have been illadvised. The procedures must give the appearance of rationality and
reasonableness and must provide a way of handling a dispute in a proper
way. If that happens to be a method that is also rational from the international lawyer's point of view, then why do we not do it?
The idea of a chamber of the court should be looked into. I know that
our president is looking into this, and I want it to be clear that there is some
problem about the role of the selection of the named judges. There is no
question about the number; the parties control the number of the judges.
There may be some question as to the actual personalities because both parties would want to be fairly certain about the strength of the tribunal. Here,
I agree with what Professor Baxter was saying. He was implying that the
tribunal in the Beagle Channel case was a very strong tribunal. One of the
great advantages of arbitration is that you can control the thing. I do not
think we should close our eyes to the fact that other countries are thinking
about the possibilities before them. We should not be confined by our own
past experience, which has been extremely pragmatic but to some extent
unimaginative. So, I continue to be optimistic.
Donat Pharand
Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up on the question of the composition of the chamber of the Court. If I am to understand Dean Macdonald
correctly, shall we say that the practice of the Court is really nonexistent. I
do not think that a chamber has ever been chosen. Now, however, shall we
say that the disposition or attitude of the President of the Court is simply
this: although the rules of the Court do not provide for the parties to be able
to choose the members of the panel, the Court, or at least the President,
would be well-disposed toward accepting a panel chosen by the parties.
If the parties were to have that assurance in advance, this would make a
considerable difference. Theoretically, if the rules are followed and if I
understand them correctly, the only thing the parties can do is to say that we
want three or five judges. And, theoretically, the rules provide for the judges
to elect five among themselves. That is the theory. If the practice is different,
or would be different, this would be excellent because the parties might be
much more disposed to submit a dispute for settlement by a chamber of the
Court. In that case, we would have the great advantages outlined by Dean
Macdonald. The infrastructure is there, but the greatest advantage would be
in having a decision of the Court as if it were a decision of the full bench.
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One could rely on that as constituting a precedent in the loose sense. Perhaps
that panel would follow more closely the previous decisions of the Court than
an arbitral tribunal such as the Anglo-French tribunal. That tribunal seemed
to have paid lip service, more than anything else, to the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, and then proceeded to depart considerably from that
decision.
I would appreciate it if Dean Macdonald could comment upon this
aspect a little more. I want to make sure I fully understand what he said
about the possibilities of the parties producing a list and having it accepted.
As I understand it, what you have said is that if the Court does not accept
the list which is presented, the parties could have agreed in advance to
withdraw.
R.St.J. Macdonald, Q.C.
I think you have summed it up, Mr. Pharand. The rules clearly provide
that the parties control the number of judges. In my testimony before the
Senator's committee, I expressed the view that the parties also controlled the
composition of the panel. I think that is important in view of the fact that
there are fifteen judges from different backgrounds. The quality is not
uniform, and the expertise in particular areas of the law varies somewhat.
Therefore, the parties have an interest in getting the best judges they can. As
an aside, I assume that is one reason for the route that was taken in the
Beagle Channel case which came up with a very powerful panel. However, in
his article in the American Journal of International Law, the current President of the International Court stated categorically that the parties controlled
the composition of the Court. Doctor Rosenne, whom I think we would
regard as one of the great authorities in this area, has reaffirmed that view in
his article in the Israeli Law Review. In the American Journal article, the
President of the Court gave, as the reason for his statement, the fact that the
parties would simply refuse to go ahead. They would have made an agreement before hand that if they did not get the judges they wanted, they would
not proceed. The implication is that the Court would, within the context of
its procedures, give effect to the wishes of the parties.
The difference between what I said in the Senator's committee and what
I am saying now, which is a result of having had an opportunity to look at it
in detail, is that, admittedly, this is important. The parties are in the hands
of the Court which, itself, makes the selection of the judges. Consequently,
only one of two possibilities exist. Either the Court will elect the judges whom
the parties have requested, or it will not. If it does, the case will go forward
into chambers with all of the advantages that have been identified. If the
Court does not elect the requested panel, and either Ottawa or Washington
believes the bench is not sufficiently powerful, let us say, it does not have law
of the sea judges on it, then they can go to arbitration or drop it completely.
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Myres McDougal

I hate to be a troublemaker and raise delicate questions, but I think we
have gotten into too much relatively trivial detail before we have clarified the
major problems. I think Dean Macdonald hit the right note when he suggested that perhaps dispute settlement was much too narrow a focus for what
we are concerned with here. There are some very fundamental problems. We
are neighbors on a large continent in a large world, and we are afflicted with
interdependencies whether we like them or not. I cannot help but believe that
our fundamental problems are how we handle the major areas, such as the
environment. They are not going to go away with the settlement of a few particular disputes. These are continuing activities requiring continuing administration. We should think about the problems of prevention and deterrence, rather than attempting to settle a dispute once it has occurred. We
must have a much more detailed clarification of the policies to which we both
admit. Most of these policies concern administration.
This brings me back to some very distressing things that I have heard
here. It was suggested that perhaps Canada was not a sovereign state and
that there are some powers beyond the compass of the federal government.
My thoughts happened to go back to 1968, in Vienna, where Ambassador
Wershof and I were members of the United States and Canadian delegations
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Someone had come forward with a federal state clause, and Ambassador Wershof said that he would
like some support even if we went down with flags flying. We supported him
to the bitter end, and we did go down with flags flying. There is no federal
state clause in the Convention on the Law of Treaties. I think it would be a
rash man who would suggest that that Convention is not now the customary
law of the world. Under international -law, a state is sovereign whether it
knows it or not. My country has, on occasion, plead the federal clause, but it
can no longer do so. There is nothing beyond the scope of the treaty power in
our country. Even the American Bar Association has finally learned this. I
am curious to know what you can do and what you cannot do. Can you really
cope with some of these great problems? What is the scope of your treaty
power?
A sgcond thing that disturbed me greatly was all this talk about the difference between political questions and legal questions. These words are very
vague and ambiguous and have different meanings in constitutional law and
international law. In my country, the difference between political and legal is
simply: when the question is so hot, and the Supreme Court does not have
the guts to handle it, it calls it political and heads for the door. As I had
understood it, on the international level, the difference is that it is political
when a state is unwilling to submit a dispute to the processes of law; ,it is
legal when a state is willing to submit it to the processes of law.
I remember a book by Judge Lauterpacht published in the 1920's, in
which he examined this for five hundred pages and concluded that there was

1978]

DISCUSSION

nothing that was not inherently legal. This distinction between political and
legal on the international level is completely illusory. If you think, for a moment, that the main function of the law for five thousand years has been to
enable the members of a community to clarify and secure their common interests, this distinction makes absolutely no sense as far as our two countries
are concerned. However, if Canada has some distinction between political
and legal in its Constitution that we have to be aware of, I would be grateful
if you would let us know what it is. Therefore, the main theme I would suggest is that our job is much more deep and fundamental. Dispute settlement
is a matter of how we cooperate and work together on problems that we cannot possibly escape.
Marcel Cadieux, c.r.
I would just like to say a word about this distinction between legal and
non-legal problems. Specifically, one of the things that might be difficult to
negotiate between Canada and the United States is who gets what proportion
of scallops on the east coast. This is worth many millions of dollars. At the
moment, Canada is taking about eighty-seven percent. There is going to be a
problem if anybody wants to change that, either now or in later years. I submit that the resolution of that problem, which is at the center of our dispute
with the United States, may not be possible on legal grounds. This will involve a good deal of horse-trading, and I do not know what the criteria might
be. If the arbitrator were to be called in to settle this, he would have to go
beyond considerations of general equity and make an assessment of what will
carry the communities on both sides of the border.
Myres McDougal
Is the Ambassador familiar with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case?
Marcel Cadieux, c.r.
You may assume that I am familiar with it.
Myres McDougal
The issue was whether the English or the Norwegians got the fish. The
Court gave it to the Norwegians because they were hungrier. And this was
settled on purely legal grounds. Ultimately, everything in law comes back to
reasonableness. Canadians can show that eighty-seven percent is reasonable.
The only question is whether you are willing to submit it to a third-party
decision?
Blair Hankey
I would like to refer to two points made by Ambassador Cadieux. First,
judges have a somewhat different role in American society than they have in
Canadian society. There is a greater willingness on the part of American
political leaders to refer to the courts what we would regard as essentially
political questions. Second, there is a certain reluctance on the part of the
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Canadian government to refer Canada-United States issues to third-party settlement because the political leaders regard it as a failure if they are unable
to manage these questions through negotiation.
This would seem to reflect a rather different role and different attitude
toward litigation in our two cultures. I remember reading an article comparing the role of lawyers, courts and litigation in British as opposed to
American society. The article noted that there were twenty times more high
court judges in the State of New York than there were in the entire United
Kingdom and many more lawyers in the American Congress and in the
Cabinet than the House of Commons or the British Cabinet. Generally, there
was a very different attitude towards litigation in the United States than in
the United Kingdom.
Canada would appear to stand somewhere between the United States and
the United Kingdom, or perhaps between the United States and France, in its
attitudes toward litigation. I think there is a much greater reluctance in
Canada to refer matters to litigation than there is in the United States. One
almost has the feeling that in the United States there is a certain element of
fashionableness in going to court. I wonder whether Dean Macdonald's enthusiasm for going to court on international matters might not be related to
what I think is his American background.
Chairman van Roggen
Several of you have referred to the different role of judges in our two
societies as though it stems from a possible cultural difference or a difference
in attitude toward courts: a more litigious attitude in the United States. I
would suggest, however, that it is rooted in our respective constitutions.
There is a very fundamental difference between our two systems. In England,
where Parliament can make a man a woman, there is no constitution or Bill
of Rights as there is in the United States. Consequently, there are not the
same restrictions acting upon Parliament if it wishes to enact certain legislation.
In the United States, Congress must stay within the jurisdiction given to
it under the Constitution. Canada, as somebody mentioned a moment ago, is
halfway between the two. One can go to court if a provincial legislature impinges upon federal jurisdiction and vice versa. However, as long as Parliament and the provincial legislatures stay within the area of jurisdiction assigned
to them under the British North America Act, they, too, can make a man a
woman. Canadians do not have the same ability, with which Americans are
endowed, to correct abuses by Parliament and the legislatures through
recourse to the courts. Americans do. Therefore, it would appear that it is
more of a constitutional concept than a cultural distinction which results in
the different use of our courts. This, at least, is my judgment, and it convinces me that we must have an entrenched Bill of Rights in our Constitution
in Canada to protect ourselves in a similar manner.
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W.C. Graham
I wonder if the panel could elaborate a little more on this problem of the
lack of communication or consultation, for those of us who are not as
familiar with international law. I bring that up because Professor Baxter's
colleague, Professor Soame, has made a great point of that in the meetings
between the United States and Canadian Bar committees, where they are
discussing the same subject with which we are concerned here today. As an
outsider, I found it very difficult to believe there was a lack of consultation or
communication. I wondered whether it is realistic to propose another tier of
administrative bureaucracy to provide communications which I thought should
already be there by virtue of the traditional channels. I would be very interested if the members of the panel would aid us by identifying the reasons
for that lack of communication and whether an alternative tier communication is going to solve the problem. In an area such as the antitrust laws, is it
really the lack of communication or prior notification? Do we not have to
recognize that there are some areas where, without an arbitration mechanism
to deal with these problems, states cannot be forced even to communicate?
This takes us back to Mr. Leigh's point: the United States Department of
Justice does not talk to the State Department when it is deciding whether to
prosecute, and the same problem exists in our own society. Without the arbitration mechanism, the communication is not taking place because it is not
necessary. I do not think it is because of the lack of a communication
mechanism. However, I would be very interested if the panel would tell us if
the mechanism is there for that communication.
Marcel Cadieux, c.r.
Based on some years of experience in government administration, I think
that the process of making decisions is getting to be more complex than it used
to be. There is more participation, and it takes a little longer for the political
leadership to assess the various implications of a policy decision. This leads to
the very delicate problem of determining at which point you relate to the
other side of the border, and here, because of differences in size, I must confess that the Americans are very worried if we intervene in their process
before they are through.
Chairman van Roggen
Thank you, Ambassador Cadieux. I think I am going to declare this
meeting adjourned.

